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Themes of Injustice: Wrongful 
Convictions, Racial Prejudice, and 
Lawyer Incompetence 
By Bennett L. Gershman* 
The U. S. criminal justice system has undergone radical changes 
in the past generation. Crime is more complex; prosecutors are more 
powerful; and courts, corrections agencies, and defense services are 
burdened with larger case loads and tighter budgets. It is not the 
best of times to talk about justice. Yet, it is a subject that needs to be 
constantly addressed, particularly in times of crisis. The following 
essay focuses on some of the problems that present themselves in the 
criminal justice system today, including the conviction of innocent 
defendants, especially in capital cases; racial prejudice; and lawyer 
incompetence. 
There has always existed a tension between justice and law.' 
Contrary to popular belief, justice and law are not coextensive. 
They may coincide, for example, when law is used to end racial 
or other invidious discriminatory practices. On the other hand, 
justice and law may be strikingly at odds, as in the Los Angeles 
jury's verdict last year acquitting four police officers in the brutal 
beating of Rodney King. There are just laws. And there are 
unjust laws. There are judges who believe they should dispense 
justice, And there are judges who believe they should mechani-
cally apply the law, regardless of the equities. 
Notwithstanding the election of a new president, and a poten-
tially new make-up ·of the Supreme Court, there is much cause 
for concern over justice in the United States. To borrow from 
Shakespeare, "the times are out of joint. "2 The Bill of Rights, 
whose two-hundredth anniversary we celebrated recently, has 
been sapped of much of its vitality over the past twenty years by 
a determined Supreme Court, two conservative presidents, and 
• Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York. 
This essay is based on remarks delivered on Law Day 1992 before the Rocldand 
County Bar AssociatIon, New City, N. Y. 
1 For an excellent coursebook addressing this fascinating subject, see A. D' Amato 
& A. Jacobson, Justice and the Legal System (1992). 
, W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, scene v. 
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a law-and-order Congress. Virtually every key protection of the 
Bill of Rights has been diluted, eviscerated, or interpreted out of 
existence.' A recent polls shows that few 1990s Americans can 
identify the Bill of Rights or are aware of its guarantees.' Two of 
its greatest defenders-Justices William J. Brennan and Thur-
good Marshall-are gone. And the highest court mirrors the 
public's insensitivity and apathy by continuing a steady retreat 
from its long-recognized function "to be watchful for the consti-
tutional rights of the citizen, and against any steady encroaciF-' 
ments thereon. "s 
This erosion of judicial protection for individual rights is also 
reflected in the agonizing death of Habeas Corpus, the Great 
Writ of liberty second only to the Magna Carta. We have 
witnessed over the past decade a frantic legal foot-race between 
a majority of the Supreme Court and some members of Congress 
to abolish habeas corpus, thereby preventing state inmates from 
seeking federal judicial redress for constitutional violations. To 
be sure, as with any legal remedy, habeas corpus can be abused. 
But statistics show that writs from state prisoners on death row 
have been found meritorious in one third to one half of all cases. 6 
Not long ago, we watched anxiously as a few federal judges in 
California stayed an execution so that they could decide whether 
using cyanide gas for executions-the kind used in the concentra-
tion camps of World War II-violated evolving constitutional 
standards of decency. 7 In a tense, early morning battle of judicial 
power, a majority of the Supreme Court firmly directed the 
execution to proceed, reminding us of Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
view about delays in executions: "Let's get on with it. ". 
'w. Kunstler, "The Bill of Rights-Can It Survive?," 26 Gonz. L. Rev. 1 
(1991) . 
• "Poll Finds Only 33% Can Identify Bill of Rights," N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 
1991, at 33. 
, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,636 (1886). 
6 I. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 2.2, 23-24 n. 
97 (1988) (49 percent success rate); Godbold, "Pro Bono Representation of Death 
Sentenced Inmates," 42 Rec. N.Y. City B. Ass'n 859, 873 (1987) (one third success 
rate). See also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, I., 
dissenting) (over 70 percent of cases decided in favor of death sentenced petitioners). 
, Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713, 1714 (1992) ("No further stays of Robert 
Alton Harris' execution shall be entered by the federal courts except upon order of 
this Court."). See .uso Bishop, "After Night of Court Battles, a California 
Execution," N. Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1992, at 1. 
• Id. 
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Diminished protection for individual liberties parallels dimin-
ished protection for civil rights. Blatant prejudice and racial 
discrimination continue to infect the criminal justice system. 
There was a time when northerners in this country would deride 
the southern judicial system for operating a racist justice. Be-
tween 1930 and 1974, of the 455 men executed in the south 
for rape, 405, or 89 percent were black. Virtually all of the 
complainants were white.' But we delude ourselves if we think 
that racial prejudice is confined to the South. A recent report by 
the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities states 
that minority users of the New York State court system "face 
many of the same travesties as did their southern counterparts-
unequal access, disparate treatment, and frustrated opportu-
nity. "10 
Further, our nation's appetite for executing people, even 
arguably innocent people, seems to be increasing. There are 
presently 2,729 inmates on death row. 1I We will execute more 
men and women this year than in any year since the Supreme 
Court allowed executions to resume in 1976. At a time in our 
history when the highest court in the land makes life and death 
decisions based on technical procedural grounds, rather than 
justice, and begins an opinion that will decide whether a con-
demned man will live or die with the words, "This is a case 
about federalism," 12 it is important to talk about justice. 
However, defining the idea of justice, and the quintessential 
"just result," often proves a frustrating and elusive task. The 
term itself is so indefmite and subjective. Is justice done when a 
condemned prisoner is put to death for murder without an 
opportunity to present new evidence of his innocence?" Is it 
justice when a court's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act 
prevents judges from hearing claims against persons charged 
with obstructing access to an abortion clinic?14 These examples 
- 'United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, J., 
concurring) . 
" New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities vii (1990) (letter dated May 
16, 1990, from Franklin H. WilliamS, Esq., Chairman of the Commission, to Chief 
Justice Sol Wachtler). 
" Death Row U.S.A. 1 (Spring 1993). 
" Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2552 (1991). 
" Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). 
" Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). 
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may appear to some to be the antithesis of justice. Others, 
however, may see them as perfectly neutral applications oflaw. 
Rather than talk about the concept of justice in the abstract, it 
might be more realistic to talk 'about the other side of justice, the 
concept of injustice. For if the meaning of justice eludes us, the 
meaning of injustice might be easier to grasp. Perhaps partici-
pants in the criminal justice system can arrive at greater under-
standing and sensitivity about their professional obligations, and 
confront justice issues more effectively and even compassion-
ately, by focusing on the subject of injustice: what broad catego-
ries provide the grist for miscarriages of justice; who is 
responsible for perpetrating those injustices; how they can be 
corrected, if it is not too late." Three overriding themes of 
injustice come to mind: convicting the innocent, racial prejudice, 
and lawyer incompetence. 
Convicting the Innocent 
Our society, as expressed by the Supreme Court in the 
landmark case of In re Winship, 16 has made a fundamental value 
judgment that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than 
to let a guilty person go free. Indeed, we probably could reach a 
consensus that the greatest injustice any society can perpetrate is 
to convict, and possibly even put to death, an innocent person. 
We read recently of two men released from a California state 
penitentiary after spending seventeen years in jail for what the 
judge described as a "concocted murder conviction. "17 Of the 
2,729 men and women on death row in the United States, there 
are several persons who, based on reports of newly discovered 
evidence, probably are innocent. We prefer not to think about 
such matters. We prefer to trust prosecutors, judges, andjuries 
to do the right thing. 
Prosecutors, however, often do not do the right thing, as 
several recently highly publicized murder cases have docu-
l' The catalyst for the discussion of the subject of justice in terms of injustice 
came from the late Edmund Cabn's outstanding work, Confronting Injustice (1967). 
" 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
"Mydans, "After 17 Years, Sunshine and Freedom," N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 
1992, at A14. 
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mented. 18 Judges also shirk their responsibility to prevent miscar-
riages of justice, as demonstated by the Supreme Court's anti-
habeas crusade.19 Juries also make mistakes, terrible mistakes , 
particularly when the prosecution's proof is mistaken or fabri-
cated.20 Persons who carefully examined the evidence have made 
a persuasive case that Roger Coleman in Virginia, and Leonel 
Herrera in Texas, had strong claims to innocence.21 Indeed, 
virtually every law-enforcement official in the state of Texas was 
convinced that Randall Dale Adams was guilty of murdering a 
police officer, until a courageous mm-maker-not a lawyer, 
prosecutor, or judge-produced a documentary entitled "The 
Thin Blue Line," which exposed the Texas judicial system at its 
most vicious and corrupt, and which led to Adam's exoneration.22 
According to a well-known study published in 1987, more 
than 350 people in this century have been erroneously convicted 
in the United States of crimes punishable by death; 116 of those 
were sentenced to death and 23 actually were executed." This 
same study found that there have been twenty-nine mistaken 
convictions in capital cases in New York State, sixteen of which 
resulted in death verdicts." New York State leads all states in 
executing the innocent; eight New Yorkers have been executed 
in error." And a recent study prepared by the New York State 
Defenders Association concludes that fifty-nine wrongful homi-
" The cases are those of Randall Dale Adams in Texas, James Richardson and 
Joseph Brown in Florida, and Eric Jackson in New York. See B. Gershman, Abuse 
of Power in the Prosecutor's Office, The World & 1477,480 (June 1991). 
"Greenhouse, "A Window on the Court-Limits on Inmates' Habeas Corpus 
Petitions Illuminate Mood and Agenda of the Justices," N.Y. Times, May 6, 1992, 
at AI. 
'" The recent scandal in upstate New York involving fake evidence may be merely 
an indication of a much more pervasive phenomenon. See "Former State Trooper 
Explains Ways He Fabricated Evidence," N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1993, at B5; 
"Trooper's Fall Shakes Both Police and Public," N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1992, at 
41; Suro, "Ripples of a Pathologist's Misconduct in Graves and Courts of West 
Texas," N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,1992, at 22; Holloway, "False Changes by Woman 
Culminate in Her Arrest," N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1992, at 47. 
11 Killing Justice-Government Misconduct and the Death Penalty, Death Penalty 
Information Center (1992). 
" Gershman, "The Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in the Fact-Finding Process?" 9 
PaceL. Rev. 275 (1989). 
" Bedau & Radelet, "Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases," 40 
Stan. L. Rev. 21, 36 (1987). 
" /d. at 37. 
" Rosenbaum, "Inevitable Error: Wrongful New York State Convictions, 1965-
1988," 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 807,809 (1990-1991). 
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cide convictions have occurred in New York between 1965 and 
1988.26 
Judges, lawyers, and the general public trust the legal system 
to make reliable determinations of guilt. The right to counsel, 
confrontation, compulsory process, trial by jury, and heightened 
standards of proof manifest our society's commitment to truth. 
We also trust that claims of innocence will be heard before it is 
too late. Consider in this context the case of Roger Coleman. He 
was found gUilty of raping and murdering Wanda McCoy in 
1981, and sentenced to death. A lengthy article in the New 
Republic makes a powerful case for Coleman's innocence." He 
was represented at trial by court-appointed lawyers who had 
never before defended a murder case. Proof of his innocence 
was presented and rejected by a Virginia trial court. Coleman 
sought to appeal to the state court of appeals, but Coleman's 
lawyers filed their notice of appeal two days late. Because of this 
procedural error, the Virginia court rejected his appeal. Coleman 
then unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus review, seeking 
to have his claim of innocence examined on the merits. The 
Supreme Court, in upholding the refusal of the federal courts to 
entertain Coleman's petition on the merits, never discussed 
whether Coleman might have been innocent." The majority 
opinion discussed whether a decision of a state court finding 
procedural default because a lawyer's filing delay is entitled to 
respect under principles of federalism. The Court said that it 
was. Coleman was executed on May 22,1992. 
Consider also the case of Leonel Herrera. Herrera was 
sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer in Texas in 
1981." Herrera maintained from the beginning that he was 
innocent. His conviction was based largely on his own statements, 
which he claimed were fabricated by the police. Herrera offered 
several affidavits and eyewitness accounts to prove his innocence, 
including an eyewitness affidavit from the real murderer's own 
son. Last February, a federal district judge stayed the execution 
to allow Herrera to prove his innocence at an evidentiary hearing. 
The Texas director of criminal justice appealed, and the Court 
" [d. at 808. 
" Tucker, "Dead End," New Republic 21 (May 4,1992). 
"Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). 
" Herrera v. Collins, 954F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ordering Herrera's 
execution for the following day. 30 In dispensing its swift justice 
the court wrote the following chilling words: "Herrera's clam; 
of 'actual innocence' presents no substantial claim for relief. The 
rule is well established that claims of newly discovered evidence , 
casting doubt on petitioner's guilt, are not cognizable in federal 
. habeas corpus. "31 The court of appeals held, in essence, that the 
Constitution does not forbid the execution of an innocent man. 
Herrera filed a petition in the Supreme Court hours before 
his scheduled execution. He sought an appeal and a stay of his 
execution. The Supreme Court responded in a manner that 
reflects the nightmarish, Kafkaesque quality that so much of 
current death penalty jurisprudence was acquired. The Court 
allowed Herrera the opportunity to bring his appeal. Four jus-
tices-Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter-
granted certiorari, because that number is required under Su-
preme Court rules for a case to be heard. 32 The question on which 
these justices granted certiorari was whether it violates the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to execute a person who has been 
convicted of murder, but who is innocent. However, the Supreme 
Court rules require a majority of five justices to stay an execution. 
And a majority of the justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices White, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas-believed that the 
execution should proceed on schedule, notwithstanding that the 
Court had decided to hear the condemned man's case. 33 Herrera's 
execution was set for April 15. Two days before the execution, 
the Texas court of criminal appeals, by a five to three vote, stayed 
Herrera's execution to allow the Supreme Court to consider the 
merits of the claim.34 
The Court heard arguments last October, and decided the 
case in January." Speaking for a five-judge majority, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote that, although Herrera's proof of inno-
cence had some probative value, it came too late. Moreover, he 
., [d. 
" [d. at 1033. 
32 Herrerav. Collins, 112S. Ct. 1074(1992). 
33 [d. 
" Suro, "Inmate Given Stay to Argue That Execution Would Violate Rights," 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1992, atA21. 
" Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. at 853. 
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did not present a sufficient showing to entitle him to a hearing to 
prove his innocence. His only recourse would be to seek executive 
clemency. Herrera was executed on May 12, 1993. 
Under the U.S. criminal justice system, any death case-
indeed, virtually every sort of criminal case-from beginning to 
end is exclusively an exercise of the prosecutor's use, and abuse, 
of power. 36 Ethically the prosecutor is obligated "to seek justice, 
not merely to convict.' '37 In pursuit of "justice," the prosecutor 
alone decides what criminal charges to bring, and whether to 
charge a murder case as a capital case. The prosecutor alone 
decides whether to allow a defendant to plead guilty, to grant 
immunity to accomplices, to rely on the testimony of jailhouse 
informants, or to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence. 
All of these decisions are largely unreviewable, and, therefore, 
subject to abuse. The prosecutor literally decides who goes to 
jail, and who goes free; who lives, and who dies. The recent 
prosecutions of John Gotti and Manual Noriega demonstrated 
astonishingly broad grants of immunity to murderers and drug 
traffickers so that they would become government witnesses; 
these people had criminal records far more extensive and serious 
than the defendants on trial. 38 Public exposes increasingly describe 
how purchased, and frequently perjurious, testimony by govern-
ment informants is used to convict defendants, often with a wink 
and a nod from the prosecutor. 39 Many prosecutors, if they are 
candid, would admit that testimony of jailhouse stoolpigeons is 
often utterly unreliable, but unbelievably effective before ajury. 
Some prosecutors have even been heard to boast that "Any 
prosecutor can convict a guilty man; it takes a great prosecutor 
to convict an innocent man. "40 
Concealment by prosecutors of favorable evidence that would 
assist a defendant in proving his innocence is pervasive and 
probably accounts for as many miscarriages of justice as any 
" B. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct (1985). 
" ABA Standards for Cimina/Justice§ 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1992). 
"Johnston, "No Victory for Panama," N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1992, at 1 
(prosecution called forty witnesses who were convicted drug traffickers, fifteen of 
whom were granted immunity for crimes more serious than those for which Noriega 
stood trial). 
" "Use of Jailhouse Informers Reviewed in Los Angeles," N. Y. Times, Jan. 3, 
1989, at A14. 
'" Note 22, supra at 275. 
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other single factor." Prosecutors, because of their superior re-
sources and early involvement with police in criminal investiga-
tions, invariably accumulate evidence that may cast doubt on a 
defendant's guilt. A prosecutor is legally and ethically obligated 
to tum over this evidence to the defense." Many prosecutors 
obey these rules. Many other prosecutors, however, violate 
these rules, sometimes inadvertently, sometimes willfully. The 
published decisions describing such misconduct are merely the 
tip of the. iceberg; most of this misconduct occurs beyond public 
or judicial scrutiny, in the twilight zone of criminal justice of 
which only prosecutors and police are aware. Moreover, the 
absence of meaningful professional discipline of prosecutors for 
such misconduct makes these tactics almost routine, and a cause 
for deep concern. 43 
Courts, bar associations, and legislatures should be much 
more alert to this quagmire in criminal justice. Reversals of 
convictions should be required automatically for the deliberate 
suppression of evidence. Disciplinary sanctions against prosecu-
tors should be the norm rather than the exception. Legislation 
should be enacted making it a crime for prosecutors to willfully 
suppress evidence resulting in a defendant's wrongful conviction, 
the degree of the prosecutor's culpability related to the gravity 
of the conviction. 
It should come as no surprise that the Supreme Court and the 
federal courts have abdicated much of their responsibility to 
ensure high standards for prosecutors. 44 However, state courts 
occasionally have filled this breach. Some state courts, notably 
the New York State Court of Appeals, have affirmatively used 
.. The cases of prosecutorial suppression of evidence are legion. See B. Gershman, 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, Ch. 5. Very recently, in People v. Alfred Davis, 81 
N.Y.2d 281 (1993), the New York Court of Appeals unanimously reversed a 
conviction obtained by the Manhattan district attorney for suppressing exculpatory 
evidence. See also "The 'Brady' Rule: Is It Working?" Nan L.I. I (May 17, 
1993). 
" Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice § 3-3. 11 (a)(3d ed. 1992). 
43 Rosen, "Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for 'Brady' Violations: A 
Paper Tiger," 65 N.C.L. Rev. 693 (1987) . 
.. See United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (l992)(federal courts have no 
supervisory authority over prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence before 
grand juries); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (\983) (federal courts 
ntay not use supervisory power to deter prosecutorial misconduct without first 
detennining whether misconduct was harmless error). 
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their own state constitutions to protect individual rights when the 
federal Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, fails 
to provide adequate protection." This "new federalism" is a 
healthy and welcome legal development, particularly at a time 
when fair play for persons charged with crime is not a popular 
view. 
Racial Prejudice 
Racial prejudice continues to haunt U.S. criminal justice. In 
its recent report, the New York State Judicial Commission on 
Minorities decried what it saw as the many similarities between 
apartheid and the travesties of justice found to exist in the U. S. 
South. The commission's findings include the frequency of all-
white juries in counties of substantial minority populations; 
minorities clustered in the worst courthouses in the state; blacks 
recei){ing sentences of incarceration where whites do not, and 
longer sentences than similarly situated whites; underrepresenta-
tion of minorities as administgrators, despite their availability in 
the labor pool; and judges taking twice as long to explain to 
whites certain of their rights as they do to blacks. In short, the 
commission concluded, "there is in New York State in the 1990' s 
the reality of a biased court system. "46 
Racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty 
is a window to racial discrimination generally. One half of the 
persons on death row in the United States are black or hispanic. 
But that is not the real story. Perhaps the most shocking statistic 
reveals that defendants charged with killing white victims are at 
least four times, and as much as eight times, more likely to 
receive a death sentence as those charged with killing black 
victims in otherwise similar cases. The most carefully docu-
mented study, the Baldus study, examined over 2,000 murder 
cases in Georgia, and isolated 230 nonracial variables." The 
study concluded that a defendant's odds of receiving a death 
.., See, e.g., Peoplev. Vilardi, 76N.Y.2d67, 556N.Y.S.2d518, 555 N.E.2d915 
(1990) (refusing to apply Supreme Court decision limiting prosecutor's disclosure 
obligations). See also Kaye, "Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle," 
61 SI. John's L. Rev. 399 (1987); Brennan, "State Constitutions and the Protection 
of Individual Rights," 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). 
" See note 10, supra. 
" D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C. Pulaski, Jr., Equal Justice and the Death 
Penalty: An Empirical Analysis (1990). 
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sentence were 4.3 times greater if the victim was white than if 
the victim was black. In some states, disparities are even higher. 48 
In Maryland, killers of whites are eight times more likely to be 
sentenced to death than killers of blacks; in Arkansas, they are 
six times more likely; and in Texas, they are five times more 
likely.49 The race of the victim also operates as a "silent aggravat-
ing circumstance" in the jury's decision to impose the death 
penalty. so 
In McCleskey v. Kemp," the Supreme Court, although ac-
cepting the validity of the Baldus study, declined to fmd the 
practice unconstitutionally discriminatory. McCleskey has been 
called the "Dred Scott" decision of this century." Justice Bren-
nan, in one of his greatest dissents, recalled that 130 years ago 
the Supreme Court denied U.S. citizenship to blacks, ,and a 
mere 3 generations ago sanctioned racial segregation. Warren 
McCleskey's evidence, Justice Brennan wrote, confronts us with 
"disturbing proof" that "we remain imprisoned by the past as 
long as we deny its influence in the present. "53 "It is tempting to 
pretend," he said, "that minorities on death row share a fate in 
no way connected to our own." This is "an illusion ... for the 
reverberations of injustice are not so easily confined .... [T]he 
way in which we choose those who will die reveals the depth of 
moral commitment among the living." Justice Brennan con-
cluded: 
The court's decision today will not change what attorneys in Georgia 
teU other Warren McCleskeys about their chances of execution. Nothing 
will soften the harsh message they must convey, nor alter the prospect that 
race undoubtedly will continue to be a topic of discussion. McCleskey's 
evidence will not have obtained judicial acceptance, but that will not 
affect what is said on death row. However many criticisms of today' s 
decision may be rendered, these painful conversations will serve as the 
most eloquent dissents of all. 54 
.. "Killers of Blacks Escape the Death Penalty, " Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 17, 
1985, at 1. 
" /d. 
'" Tabak & Lane, "The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit 
Analysis of the Death Penalty," 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 59, 90 (1989). 
" 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
" Kennedy, "McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme 
Court," 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1389 (1988). 
~ 481 U.S. at 344. 
" [d. at 344-345. 
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Warren McCleskey was executed on September 25, 1991. 
Racial injustice in jury selection also continues unabated. 
Batson v. Kentucky" sought to eliminate such discrimination. 
But blacks and other minorities continue to be excluded from 
juries, and both prosecutors and defense lawyers continue to 
provide spurious reasons for the strikes. 56 The California jury 
that acquitted the four police officers of beating Rodney King 
did not include any blacks. The blatant circumvention of Batson 
in New York State recently prompted Judge Bellacosa, in an 
opinion joined by Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Titone, to 
urge the total elimination of peremptory challenges." Judge 
Bellacosa wrote that ., 'peremptories have outlived their use-
fulness and, ironically, appear to be disguising discrimination-
not minimizing it, and clearly not eliminating it.' '58 
Incompetence of Counsel 
Finally, the inadequacy of representation, which all members 
of the legal profession should take very seriously, needs to be 
addressed. The ability of public defenders and appointed counsel 
to deliver quality defense services is being threatened by lack of 
funds, huge volume, and often inept training and supervision." 
The vast majority of criminal defendants in New York State and 
nationwide are too poor to afford private counsel and therefore 
must rely for their constitutionally guaranteed defense on legal 
aid and counsel assigned by the court. There are many talented, 
although grossly underpaid, attorneys representing indigent de-
fendants. The quality of representation in New York State is 
probably much higher than the quality of representation nation-
wide. The dismal level of indigent representation nationwide is 
particularly noticeable in those jurisdictions that allow capital 
punishment. An American Bar Association task force recently 
concluded that "the inadequacy and inadequate compensation of 
counsel at trial" was one of the "principaJfailings" of the capital 
" 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
"See, e.g., Hernandez v.' New York, III s. Ct. 1859 (1991); People v. Kern, 
75 N.Y.2d638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d647 (1990). 
" People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317. 591 N.E.2d 1136, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950 
(1992) (concurring opinion). 
" 79 N. Y.2dat 326. 
" Gershman, "Defending the Poor," 29 Trial 47 (March 1993). 
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punishment system. 60 All too often defense lawyers are ill-trained 
and unprepared. Consider the following examples. 61 
1. Larry Heath was executed last year. His court-appointed 
lawyer's appellate brief contained only a single page of 
argument, raised only a single issue, and cited only a 
single legal precedent. 
2. Herbert Richardson was executed in 1989. His appellate 
brief failed to mention that at his sentencing hearing the 
prosecutor argued, without any basis in the record, but 
with no objection by defense counsel, that Richardson 
should be sentenced to death because he belonged to a 
black muslim organization in New York, had killed a 
woman in New Jersey, and had been dishonorably dis-
charged from the military. Richardson's lawyer was later 
disbarred for other reasons. 
3. Arthur Jones was executed in 1986. He was represented 
at trial by a court-appointed lawyer who made no opening 
or closing statement and offered no evidence at the penalty 
phase. During the postconviction phase he was repre-
sented by a sole practitioner just two years out of law 
school who had never handled a capital case. 
4. Horace Dunkins, a mentally retarded black man who 
was executed in 1989, was represented by a lawyer so 
incompetent that the jury was never told that Dunkins was 
mentally retarded. Dunkins had an IQ of sixty-five and 
the mental age of a ten-year-old. 
5. The capital trial of a battered woman was interrupted for 
a day when her defense lawyer appeared in court so 
intoxicated that he was held in contempt and sent to jail 
for the day and night. 
6. A defense lawyer requested an adjournment between the 
guilt phase and penalty phase of a murder trial so that he 
could read the state's death penalty statute. 
7. A lawyer's brief was sent back to him by the appellate 
court because it did not cite a single case . 
., ABA Task Force Report, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review 
in State Death Penalty Cases 7 (Aug. 1990). 
" The following examples were provided by Stephen B. Bright, Esq., Director, 
Southern Center for Human Rights, in a Statement to the Committee on the Judiciary , 
U.S. Senate, regarding the nomination of Ed Carnes to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit (Apr. I, 1992). 
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8. A capital defendant was visited only once by his lawyer 
in eight years. In another case, the lawyer never visited 
his client in eight years. 
One confronts these examples with shock and dismay. Are 
they merely aberrations? Or do they reflect a much more preva-
lent condition? Clearly, incompetent lawyering. and injustice go 
hand in hand. 
While persons of means are able to obtain "the best counsel 
money can buy,' '62 these lawyers are also finding their role 
increasingly more difficult to perform effectively. More and 
more privately retained lawyers are being subpoenaed to testify 
against their clients, particularly in connection with their receipt 
of legal fees, and have been jailed for refusing to testify before 
grand juries." Prosecutors are increasingly using the statutory 
summonsing power of the Internal Revenue Service to force 
criminal defense lawyers to disclose the identities of clients who 
pay cash. 64 There has been rising incidence oflaw office searches, 
disqualification of attorneys, forfeiture of attorney fees, and 
prosecution of attorneys under obstruction of justice statutes for 
giving legal advise to clienis. 65 The future of our adversary 
system is at risk by these tactics. 
Conclusion 
The law can be a vital force for justice, as well as for injustice. 
We look to it to find rational solutions to problems and disputes, 
and we hope that these solutions achieve justice. When that 
happens, the law has a meaning beyond its often arid and sterile 
language. When that does not happen, when innocent persons 
are convicted, when racism continues to infect our courts, and 
when lawyers fail in their obligations, we confront injustice. It 
is at that time that those who participate in the criminal justice 
system can more fully appreciate their own responsibility to 
dispense justice, and to eliminate injustice. 
" Morris v. Siappy, 461 U.S. 1,23 (1983)(Brennan, J., concurring). 
" Stern & Hoffman, "Privileged Infonners: The Attorney-Subpoena Problem 
and a Proposal for Refonn," 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1783 (1988). 
M United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, 935 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1991). 
"Gershman, "The New Prosecutors," 53 U. Pin. L. Rev. 393 (1992). 
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